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Abstract 
This paper addresses the selection problem in promotion tournaments. I consider a situation 
with heterogeneous employees and ask whether an employer might be interested in repeating a 
promotion tournament. On the one hand, this yields a reduction in uncertainty over the 
employees’ abilities. On the other hand, there are costs if a workplace stays vacant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Promotion tournament, selection, heterogeneous employees, repetition. 
JEL classification: D82, M51 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Michael Brei and Matthias Kräkel for helpful comments. Financial support from the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through SFB-TR 15 (Governance and the efficiency of economic 
systems) is gratefully acknowledged. 
∗∗ Oliver Gürtler, Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, 
Germany. Tel.:+49-228-739214, Fax:+49-228-739210; E-mail:oliver.guertler@uni-bonn.de 
 2
1. Introduction 
In practice, tournaments are very famous, since they help to determine the most able 
competitor in a simple way and, therefore, mitigate problems due to informational 
asymmetries. Consider, for example, a company trying to fill a vacancy on a high hierarchy 
level, but not knowing the abilities of the lower-level employees. Clearly, this company wishes 
to fill the vacancy with a rather able employee, since an unable employee might perform badly 
and, hence, might influence the company’s profit in an unfavourable way. One possibility for 
the company is to arrange an inner-company promotion tournament.1 As an able employee is 
more likely to win the tournament than an unable employee, the asymmetry problem would be 
weakened. However, the tournament outcome might be affected by luck or random 
components. So, the probability that an unable employee wins the tournament and the company 
promotes the “wrong” one is positive. 
There is only little literature discussing this selection problem in tournaments.2 Meyer (1991) 
e.g. considers a series of promotion tournaments between two heterogeneous employees, where 
the number of tournaments is exogenously given. She demonstrates that the problem of 
incorrect promotion decisions may be mitigated by biasing the tournament results. If only 
ordinal information about the employees’ performances is available, an optimal bias (that in 
most cases favours the actual leader in the tournament) will increase the tournament’s 
information content such that the information becomes a sufficient statistic for cardinal 
information. Clark and Riis (2001) show that the problem of incorrect promotion decisions can 
be solved by combining a promotion tournament with several test standards. In their model, 
there are three tournament prizes, and the tournament’s winner receives the highest prize only 
if he additionally passes two tests. By using the test standards, the employer receives further 
information about the employees’ abilities. With this information, the selection problem might 
be solved completely. In contrast, Hvide and Kristiansen (2003) emphasise the relevance of the 
selection problem. They examine a promotion tournament, in which the employees are able to 
choose strategies of different risk. In this case the selection problem is quite relevant, as a low-
ability employee might choose a very risky strategy and so may overturn his ability 
disadvantage. 
This paper regards a practical instrument to weaken the selection problem that is very 
successful in sports. Most tournaments in sports are characterised by the existence of repeating 
competition, i.e., players compete more than one time. In this case, the tournament’s winner is 
                                                 
1 In this work, I do not analyse whether a tournament is optimal in the class of all contracts. I assume that the 
company uses a promotion tournament to fill a vacancy because of its practicability and ask how to improve it. 
2 The literature on rank-order tournaments mostly focuses on the use of tournaments as incentive scheme. See e.g. 
Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) or Rosen (1986). 
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the player that has the highest success on average. For example, in golf3, the competitors play 
18 holes, and the winner is the player that needs the fewest shots to pocket the golf ball in all 
18 holes.4 Imagine an extreme situation, in which the competitors play only one hole to 
identify the most able player. In this situation, the quality of the tournament results is very 
doubtful. An able player might have unfavourable conditions (e.g. strong wind or rain) and, 
therefore, might need more shots than a less able competitor playing under good conditions. In 
the contrary extreme situation, the number of competitions between the golf players would be 
infinitely large. The law of large numbers then predicts that the tournament’s winner is surely 
the most able player, so the selection problem would be solved. However, it is arguably 
impossible to golf an infinitely high number of holes. 
In this paper, the repetition mechanism is transferred to an inner-company promotion 
tournament. An employer decides about the number of tournaments he arranges between two 
heterogeneous employees. His decision is thereby determined by the following trade-off: On 
the one hand, it is costly for the employer to operate more than one tournament, since he 
wishes to fill a vacant workplace. On the other hand, extending the number of tournaments 
reduces uncertainty about the employees` abilities and leads to higher expected future profits. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 contains the description of the 
basic model. Thereafter, in section 3, the model solution is presented. In particular, it is shown 
under what circumstances the employer is interested in extending the tournament. While the 
primary aim of section 3 is to examine the selection properties of the above described and 
widely used mechanism, section 4 presents some instruments to further improve selection 
quality. Concluding remarks are offered in section 5. 
 
2. Description of the model and notation 
Consider a risk-neutral principal arranging a series of k one-period tournaments between two 
heterogeneous and non risk-loving employees. Without loss of generality, employee 1 is the 
more able one with ability  and employee 2 the less able one with ability . I 
define  as . A situation with asymmetric information is assumed such that each 
employee knows her own ability and the ability of her opponent, whereas the employer only 
knows that there is one able employee with ability  and one unable employee with ability 
. Both employees might presently work in the same department of their company and, for 
this reason, are able to estimate the abilities of each other in a detailed way, while the employer 
Ha La ( )LH aa >
LH aa − a∆
Ha
La
                                                 
3 Other examples include sports like skiing or cycling. 
4 The primary aim of repetition in sports is to entertain spectators for a certain period rather than to solve the 
selection problem. Yet clearly, repeating competition mitigates this problem. 
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naturally has less information about his employees’ abilities. The winner of the overall 
tournament will be promoted to a vacant workplace at a higher level in the company. This 
workplace is already vacant when the first tournament starts. Therefore, the net profit of the 
company from this workplace is zero in each period during the tournament. If the able 
employee is promoted, this profit will be { }HL , ππ∈π , with  and 
 in each period.
0LH =π>π
{ } ( 1,0pobPr H ∈=π=π ) }
)
5 Otherwise, it will be , with 
.
{ HL , ππ∈π
{ } ( p,0qobPr H ∈=π=π 6 That is, the able employee is more likely to achieve a high profit 
than the less able one. The company and the two employees discount future utilities with 1r ≤ . 
Their time horizon is infinite. Intuitively, r could be interpreted as the probability that 
employee i (i=1,2) continues to work for the company in the next period. Suppose that the 
performance of employee i in the tournament in period t (t=1,…,k), , is given by the sum of 
the effort  he has chosen in this tournament, his ability  and a random noise . 
ity
ite ia itε
(1) itiitit aey ε++= .7
It is assumed that these performances do not increase the company’s profits. They are only 
useful as a signalling instrument.8 The random components itε  are independently drawn from a 
normal distribution with mean zero and variance . Effort entails costs for an employee 
which are given by  with 
2σ
( )iteC ( ) 00C = , ( ) 0eC it >′  and ( ) 0eC it >′′ . In case of promotion, the 
promoted employee in each period receives an income w. It is further assumed that an 
employee’s utility is additively separable in income and costs. Therefore, the expected utility 
of employee i (i=1,2) is given by ( ) ( ) (∑
=
− ⋅−−⋅⋅=
k
1j
ij
1jk
ikik eCrr1rwUPEU ) where ( ) 00U = , 
 and .  denotes the employee’s winning-probability. I start by ( ) 0wU >′ ( ) 0wU ≤′′ ikP
                                                 
5 It is assumed that an employee on the higher level receives a wage of w, while he receives a wage of zero on the 
lower level. At the beginning of the tournament, the high-level workplace is vacant and so, during the tournament, 
nothing is produced on the workplace and no wage is paid. Thus, the profit is clearly zero. Furthermore, one could 
think that after promotion, in the good state of the world output worth wH +π  and in the bad state of the world 
output worth w is produced. 
6 Note that, from observing the output on the higher level, the principal cannot deduce the employee’s type with 
certainty. Hence, testing the employees on the higher level is only possible to some degree. Throughout the paper 
it is assumed that the model parameters are such that the tournament scheme is preferred by the principal to a 
testing scheme. This will for example be the case, if Hπ  and (p-q) are rather low so that the costs of arranging a 
tournament (the potential profits to be lost) and the gains from testing the employees are negligible. 
7 This kind of production function has the analytical advantage that the tournament will lead to symmetric effort 
choices of the employees. Symmetry will help to state the results to be derived most clearly. As there may also be 
settings, where this production function is inappropriate, section 4.1 extends the model to encompass more general 
production functions. 
8 One could justify this assumption as follows: The profits that could be generated on the primary level are so low 
compared to the ones on the higher level that they are of (almost) no importance. Alternatively, as in Clark and 
Riis (2001), one could think of the model as a hiring process, in which the company arranges a series of 
(valueless) tests in order to experience the abilities of the potential employees. 
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assuming that the employee attaining the highest aggregate output becomes the tournament’s 
winner, as this decision rule is quite frequent in practice. Different and more sophisticated 
promotion rules are considered in section 4. Further, suppose that the employees learn 
intermediate results, i.e., in a given tournament, they know the results of the previous 
tournaments. Finally, the employer determines the optimal number of tournaments to maximise 
his expected discounted profit, which is given by ( ) ( )( )[ ]Hk1k1kk qP1pPr1r π⋅⋅−+⋅⋅−=π . 
 
3. Solution to the model 
The model is solved by backward induction. Hence, we start by deriving the employees’ efforts 
in the final period. These efforts are chosen to maximise (2) and (3), respectively: 
(2) ( ) ( )( ) k11k
1t
k1k2k2k1t2t1k1 eCr1wUeeayyobPrEU −−⋅⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ε−ε>−+∆+−= ∑−
=
( ) , 
(3) ( ) ( )( ) ( k21k
1t
k1k2k2k1t2t1k2 eCr1wUeeayyobPr1EU −−⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ε−ε>−+∆+−−= ∑−
=
) . 
Let  denote the cumulative distribution function of the composite random variable kF k1k2 ε−ε , 
and  the corresponding density function. The first-order conditions to the employees’ 
maximisation problems are given by (4) and (5). 
kf
(4) ( ) ( )( ) k1!1k
1t
k2k1t2t1k
k1
k1 eCr1wUeeayyf
e
EU ′=−⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+∆+−=∂
∂ ∑−
=
( ) , 
(5) ( ) ( )( ) ( k2!1k
1t
k2k1t2t1k
k2
k2 eCr1wUeeayyf
e
EU ′=−⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+∆+−=∂
∂ ∑−
=
)
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From the first-order conditions, we see that both employees choose same effort, thus we have 
. Analogously, continuing backward induction up to the first round, we see that 
this symmetry holds in every tournament, so for all t=1,…,k we have . From an 
ex ante point of view, the winning-probability of the high-ability employee can therefore be 
written as 
kk2k1 e:ee ==
tt2t1 e:ee ==
(6)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).0GeeG:eeakobPr
akeakeobPryyobPrP
k
k
1t
t2t1k
k
1t
t2t1
k
1t
t1t2
L
k
1t
k
1t
t2t2H
k
1t
k
1t
t1t1
k
1t
t2
k
1t
t1k1
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −<∆⋅−ε−ε=
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ⋅+ε+>⋅+ε+=⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ >=
∑∑∑
∑ ∑∑ ∑∑∑
===
= == ===
 
9 As in Lazear and Rosen (1981), the second-order conditions will hold and so an equilibrium will exist if the 
variance  is sufficiently large. Intuitively, an equilibrium will only exist if luck plays a significant role. In what 
follows, the existence of an equilibrium is assumed. 
2σ
 6
In this context,  stands for the cumulative distribution function of the composite random 
variable , while  denotes the corresponding density function. 
kG
( ) akk
1t
t1t2 ∆⋅−ε−ε∑
=
kg ( )0G k  
can be rewritten as ( )( )σ⋅∆⋅Φ 2ak , where ( )⋅Φ  denotes the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. It is then straightforward to derive proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: The winning-probability of the high-ability employee is strictly increasing in k. 
 
Extending the number of tournaments from k to k+1 affects the winning-probability of the 
high-ability employee in two countervailing ways. On the one hand, abstracting from random 
factors, the difference between the two employees’ performances increases from ak ∆⋅  to 
. Hence, employee 1 is more likely to be promoted. On the other hand, the influence 
of random factors increases, too. The variance of each individual’s performance rises from 
 to ( , so employee 1 is less likely to be promoted. However, the first effect 
outbalances the second one, and the winning-probability of the able employee increases when 
the number of tournaments gets higher. For 
( ) a1k ∆⋅+
2k σ⋅ ) 21k σ⋅+
∞→k , ( )0G k  equals one. The selection problem 
would be completely eliminated by infinitely repeating the promotion tournament. 
Extending the number of tournaments is advantageous for the employer, since an incorrect 
promotion decision becomes less likely. Yet, it is also disadvantageous. The employer looses 
potential payoffs, for the workplace stays vacant for a longer time. In order to clearly 
understand how the employer decides and how the model parameters influence his decision, we 
restrict his possible actions. Particularly, we assume that the employer has to decide between 
arranging m or m+1 tournaments, where m is an integer and positive number. In this case he 
prefers m+1 tournaments, if the condition m1m π>π +  holds. This condition is rewritten in (7): 
(7) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ).qpr1qa2mra21m −−⋅>σ∆⋅Φ−⋅σ∆⋅+Φ  
From (7), I derive proposition 2 where I define σ∆= a:y : 
 
Proposition 2. If the employer has the possibility to arrange m or m+1 promotion tournaments, 
there exists a cut-off ( ) ( )( )( )1,m1mm,q,pr~ 5.0−+∈  such that the following will hold: 
(i) For r~r < , the employer always arranges m tournaments. 
(ii) For r~r > , there are two cut-offs ( ) 0m,q,pyˆ >  and ( ) 0m,q,py~ >  with  such 
that the employer arranges m+1 tournaments only if 
y~yˆ <
[ ]y~,yˆy ∈ . 
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(iii) 0pr~ <∂∂ , 0qr~ >∂∂ , 0mr~ >∂∂ , 0pyˆ <∂∂ , 0qyˆ >∂∂ , 0myˆ >∂∂ , 0py~ >∂∂ , 
0qy~ <∂∂ , 0my~ <∂∂ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
In case of a small r, the employer assigns a high value to present payoffs, but not to future 
payoffs. So he will never arrange a further tournament, since the profits in period m+1 are too 
valuable for him. 
For r higher than r~ , it is also worthwhile for the employer to care for future payoffs. In this 
case, it might be beneficial to arrange more than m tournaments in order to reduce uncertainty 
about the employees’ abilities. As stated in proposition 2, the employer’s decision in the case 
r~r >  depends on the ratio σ∆a . 
For a small  (or a large σ ), one could think that the employer decides to arrange a further 
tournament. The employees are very similar in their abilities and, hence, it is quite likely that 
arranging only m tournaments yields an incorrect promotion decision. Surprisingly, the 
employer does not so. The reason is as follows: Even if a further tournament was arranged, 
employee 1 is only little more likely to be promoted than employee 2. Due to the small ability 
difference (or the large impact of random components) a tournament in period m+1 would not 
entail very much new information about the two employees. Therefore, the disadvantage of 
lower profits prevails, and the employer decides not to extend the tournament. For intermediate 
values of  and , the argumentation is contrary. In this case the use of another tournament 
leads to much more information about the employees’ abilities. Hence, it is beneficial to extend 
the promotion tournament to accumulate more data about the employees’ abilities. Finally, for 
a large  (or a small σ ), the high-ability employee is very likely to be the leader after the 
first m tournaments. Arranging a further tournament would only yield little new information 
and, therefore, the employer decides not do so. 
a∆
a∆ σ
a∆
The effects of p and q are intuitive. If p increases, the employer will be more likely to arrange a 
further tournament as it becomes more important to identify the agent types. Similarly, an 
increase in q makes the employer less likely to arrange another tournament, as an incorrect 
promotion decision has less severe impacts on expected profit. 
Finally, the amount of new information when arranging a further tournament is decreasing in 
m. That is, if the employer has already observed many tournament outcomes, he will not 
benefit very strongly from arranging another one. Therefore, there are less combinations of 
parameter values (r,y), for which the employer decides to arrange a further tournament. 
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4. Extensions 
In the previous analysis, a simple and widely used decision rule was considered. In this section, 
the model is extended in different ways. While in section 4.1 a general performance function is 
introduced, sections 4.2 to 4.4 deal with more sophisticated decision rules. 
 
4.1 Consideration of general performance functions 
Up to this point, performance of each employee was assumed to be additively separable in 
effort and ability. This assumption simplified the model a lot, as it led to a symmetric solution, 
in which both employees choose same effort. Let us now consider more general performance 
functions. Suppose that the performance of employee i in the tournament in period t is given by 
, where ( ) itiitit a,efy ε+= 0ef it >∂∂ , ( ) 0ef 2it2 ≤∂∂ , 0af i >∂∂  and 0aef iit2 ≠∂∂∂ . 
Consider the tournament in period k. Employee 1 maximises  
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) k11k
1t
Lk2Hk1t2t1kk1 eCr1wUa,efa,efyyFEU −−⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−= ∑−
=
( ) . 
Similarly, employee 2 maximises 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( k21k
1t
Lk2Hk1t2t1kk2 eCr1wUa,efa,efyyF1EU −−⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−−= ∑−
=
) . 
The resulting equilibrium is no longer symmetric. Solving for the first-order conditions, one 
can show that employee 1 will exert higher effort than employee 2, if and only if 
0aef iit
2 >∂∂∂ , i.e., if effort and ability are complements in the performance function. This 
can be shown to hold in every period. Hence, if effort and ability are complements (substitutes) 
in the performance function, the high-ability employee will exert higher (lower) effort than the 
low-ability employee. As a result, the cut-off values  and  should become relatively smaller 
(bigger) compared to the case where 
yˆ y~
0aef iit
2 =∂∂∂ , as the difference in effort increases 
(decreases) the effective ability gap.10
 
4.2 Handicapping of employees 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, a similar result as in the case, where effort and ability are complements, should be obtained, if the 
employer, besides the tournament, makes use of test standards. Suppose that each employee would receive an 
additional payment of b units, if this employee’s aggregate performance exceeded some threshold t. The employer 
would then determine t such that the more able employee is expected to exert higher effort than his opponent. As 
the setup of the model is different from the one in Clark and Riis (2001), introducing additional test standards 
does not solve the selection problem completely. As the difference in the random components follows some 
normal distribution, random effects may always outweigh the advantage of the high-ability employee resulting 
from the effort and ability difference. 
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Let us return to the assumption that employee performance is given by (1). As in Meyer 
(1991), the employer might be interested in biasing the tournament results. I consider this 
possibility in the simplest form, in which the employer has decided to arrange two 
tournaments. Suppose that, after the first round, the actual leader in the tournament receives, 
besides the performance difference z  from the first round, a further head start of ( )zt  units. 
For ( ) 0zt >  ( ( ) 0zt < ), the loser (winner) of the first round is handicapped.11 I first show that 
handicapping does not change the symmetry of efforts. From (2) and (3) it is clear that, in the 
second tournament, both employees choose same efforts, as ( )zt  does not affect the marginal 
incentives of the two employees in a different way. Turn now to the first tournament. From the 
point of view of this tournament, the winning-probability of the high-ability employee equals 
(10)  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( .dzaeezfztzaFdzaeezfztzaF
dz
aeeF1
aeezfztzaFaeeF1
dz
aeeF
aeezfztzaFaeeFP
0
211112
0
211112
0
21111
21111
221111
0 21111
21111
22111112
∫∫
∫
∫
∞−
∞
∞−
∞
∆−+−⋅−−+∆+∆−+−⋅++∆=
∆+−−
∆−+−⋅−−+∆⋅∆+−−
+∆+−
∆−+−⋅++∆⋅∆+−=
)
   
It is given by his winning-probability in the first round times his conditional overall winning-
probability given a victory in the first round plus the probability of losing the first round times 
conditional overall winning-probability given the first round was lost. 
The employees determine  and  to maximise 11e 21e ( )( ) ( 111211 eCr1wUrPEU −− )⋅⋅=  and 
( ) ( )( ) 211221 eCr1wUrP1EU −−⋅⋅−= ( ) , respectively, which can be shown to lead to a 
symmetric equilibrium with 12111 e:ee == . 
Next consider the employer’s maximisation problem. The head start t is chosen such that 
(11) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )[ ]H12122 qztP1pztPr1r π⋅⋅−+⋅⋅−=π  
is maximised. This is equivalent to maximising . The latter problem leads to the following 
first-order condition:
12P
12
                                                 
11 One could also think that the employer randomly handicaps the employees before the first tournament starts. As 
can be shown, such a change in the decision rule does not affect the symmetry of efforts to be derived 
subsequently. As a consequence, handicapping before the first tournament does not lead to new insights and is for 
simplicity not considered. 
12 The second-order condition ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0dzazftztzafdzazftztzaf 0 12
0
12 <∆−⋅∂−−+∆∂+∆−⋅∂++∆∂ ∫∫
∞−
∞
 is 
assumed to be satisfied.  
 10
(12)     ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .0dzazfztzafdzazfztzafztztP !0 12
0
1212 =∆−⋅−−+∆−∆−⋅++∆=∂∂ ∫∫
∞−
∞
 
The employer optimally trades off the higher winning-probability of the able employee after 
winning the first tournament with the lower winning-probability after losing the first round. 
Note that, in the optimum, t need not necessarily be positive, as the principal also takes the 
employees’ initial standings, i.e., the difference in first-round performance, which is transferred 
into the second one, into account. Finally, as optimally biasing the tournament results leads to a 
better selection decision and biasing is of no value in a one-period tournament13, the employer 
is more likely to arrange a second round than he was in the model in section 3. 
 
4.3 Decision based on the number of “sets” won 
In sports like e.g. tennis or badminton a decision is based on the number of “sets” won by each 
player. To keep things as simple as possible, I compare the cases “best of one” and “best of 
three”. The former case corresponds to the model in section 3, where k=1. In the latter case, the 
employee, who first wins two tournaments is declared the winner. Note that, in this case, the 
employer will not arrange a third round, if an employee wins the first two ones. Let us analyse, 
in which way the introduction of such a decision rule affects the results derived in section 3. 
I start by assuming that the solution remained symmetric, i.e., that both employees still chose 
same efforts. In this case, the high-ability employee’s winning-probability is  in the 
“best of one” case and 
( aFP11 ∆= )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )aF1aF2aFP 2213 ∆−⋅∆⋅+∆=  otherwise.14 One can easily 
verify that  always holds. That is, if the solution remained symmetric, arranging more 
tournaments again yields a more accurate employee selection. However, contrary to our initial 
assumption, in the “best of three” case, the solution becomes asymmetric in tournaments one 
and two. To demonstrate this, let us derive the optimal efforts. If it comes to a third round, the 
solution will be the same as under “best of one”, i.e., both employees choose same efforts. In 
the second round, we have to distinguish between the case, where employee 1 won the first 
round and the case, where he lost it. In case he has won the first round, employee 1 maximises 
1113 PP >
(13)
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )122212221212 eCr1wUraFeeaF1r1wUeeaFEU −−⋅⋅∆⋅−+∆−+−⋅−+∆= , 
while employee 2 maximises 
(14) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )22221222 eCr1wUraF1eeaF1EU −−⋅⋅∆−⋅−+∆−= . 
From the first-order conditions, one can derive the following condition: 
                                                 
13 A proof of this statement is available from the author upon request. 
14 Note that , for i=1, 2, 3, as the respective composite random variables follow the same distribution. ( ) ( )⋅=⋅ f:f i
 11
(15)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )wUeeafeCeC 22122212 ⋅−+∆=′−′ . 
It can be seen that employee 1 exerts higher effort than employee 2. Contrary to employee 2, 
employee 1 has the chance to be promoted after the second round and, therefore, to receive the 
higher wage one period before employee 2 may receive it. This has the effect that the two 
employees evaluate the winner prize in a different way and hence choose different efforts. 
Denote the effort difference by . Similarly, if employee 2 was the winner of the first round, 
the solution becomes asymmetric with efforts satisfying condition (16): 
eˆ∆
(16) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )wUeeafeCeC 22121222 ⋅−+∆=′−′ . 
Here, the low-ability employee chooses higher effort as he has the chance to be promoted 
earlier than his opponent. The effort difference in this case is denoted by e~∆ . Let us now 
proceed to the first tournament. The two employees then maximise (17) and (18), respectively: 
(17)  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )
( ),eC
r1wUraFeˆaF1eeaFe~aFeeaF1
r1wUreˆaFeeaFEU
11
2
21112111
211111
−
−⋅⋅∆⋅∆+∆−−+∆+∆−∆⋅−+∆−+
−⋅⋅∆+∆⋅−+∆=
 
(18)
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )
( ).eC
r1wUraF1eˆaF1eeaFe~aFeeaF1
r1wUre~aF1eeaF1EU
21
2
21112111
211121
−
−⋅⋅∆−⋅∆+∆−−+∆+∆−∆⋅−+∆−+
−⋅⋅∆−∆−⋅−+∆−=
Subtracting the first-order conditions, yields 
(19) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1e~aFeˆaFrwUeeafeCeC 21112111 −∆−∆+∆+∆⋅⋅⋅−+∆=′−′ . 
From (19), it can be seen that e~a2eˆee 2111 ∆>∆⋅+∆⇔> . Unfortunately, in this general form 
one cannot unambiguously say, whether or not this condition is satisfied so that either 
employee might choose higher effort in the first tournament. Summarizing, introducing a “best 
of three” decision rule leads to asymmetric efforts of the employees. In the first round, it is not 
clear, which employee exerts higher effort, while in the second round, it is always the actual 
leader in the tournament. Consequently, the model does not clearly predict, whether or not 
extending the number of rounds leads to a more precise selection decision. It seems yet likely 
that, even with asymmetric efforts, arranging more tournaments increases selection accuracy. 
 
4.4 Aborting the tournament before the pre-specified number of rounds 
Until now, it was assumed that the employer is not allowed to abort the tournament before the 
pre-specified number of rounds. However, to save on vacancy costs, the employer might decide 
to do so, if, before the final tournament is reached, the employees’ performances would differ 
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significantly. This might induce a change in employee behaviour, so, the model results might 
also change. To keep the analysis tractable, suppose again that the principal decides to arrange 
two tournaments and announces to stop after the first round, if one player leads by at least 
 units. Let us solve the model by backward induction. If the second tournament is 
reached, efforts remain symmetric and satisfy 
0x ≥
22212 e:ee == . In the first tournament, employee 
1 maximises 
(20) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) .eCr1wUrdyyfyeea2F
r1wUxeeaFEU
11
xeea
xeea
121112
2111111
2111
2111
−−⋅⋅⋅−−+∆⋅+ ( )
−⋅−−+∆=
∫
+−+∆
−−+∆
 
A similar expression can be given for employee 2. An employee’s expected utility in the first 
round is given by the payment he will receive, if beating his opponent by more than x plus his 
payment, if winning the tournament after two rounds minus costs entailed by effort. Using 
Leibniz’s rule, one can determine the first-order condition to the above maximisation problem. 
It is given by 
(21) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (
( ) ( ) ( )
)
( ) ( ) .0eCr1wUr])dyyfyeea2f
xeeafxaFxeeafxaF[(
r1wUxeeaf
e
EU
!
11
xeea
xeea
121112
211112211112
21111
11
11
2111
2111
=′−−⋅⋅⋅−−+∆⋅
+−−+∆⋅+∆−+−+∆⋅−∆+
−⋅−−+∆=∂
∂
∫
+−+∆
−−+∆
 
Again, one can derive a similar expression for employee 2. As 1222 ε−ε  and  follow 
the same distribution (that is, 
1121 ε−ε
( ) ( ) ( )⋅=⋅=⋅ f:ff 21 ), the difference of the two first-order conditions 
can be written as 
(22) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]xeeafxeeafwUeCeC 211121112111 +−+∆−−−+∆⋅=′−′ . 
Condition (22) does not yield unambiguous results concerning the employees’ efforts. Both, 
 or  may hold. The asymmetry results from a change in the incentive 
structure, for the employees now not only want to win the tournament, but want to win by at 
least x to become promoted earlier. Note that the employer determines x such that his expected 
profit is maximised. He therefore considers all the effects that a change in x has. A change in x 
affects the probability of aborting the tournament (and so of realizing potential profit one 
period earlier) and the promotion probability of the high-ability employee. The latter effect is 
twofold. On the one hand, the winning-probability of the high-ability employee is directly 
affected by x, as an increase in x decreases his probability of winning the tournament after one 
round, but increases his winning-probability after two rounds. On the other hand, an increase in 
x affects the two employees’ efforts (and the effort difference) in the first round. Unfortunately, 
2111 ee > 1121 ee >
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in this general form, the model does not unambiguously predict, how the effort difference 
changes with x.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper addressed the selection problem in promotion tournaments. It was analysed, 
whether an employer might prefer to arrange a series of promotion tournaments in order to 
improve selection accuracy. While extending the number of tournaments always leads to more 
detailed information about the employees’ abilities, this information advantage may be 
outbalanced by vacancy costs that arise when the number of tournaments is increased. 
Comparing the employer’s expected utilities of arranging m or m+1 tournaments, offers further 
interesting results. When the employer is quite impatient, he always decides to arrange only m 
tournaments. When he is rather patient, his decision depends on the amount of new information 
another tournament entails. This new information depends non-monotonously on the ratio of 
the two agents’ ability difference and the error term’s standard deviation. For a very small or a 
very large ratio, the amount of new information is rather small, for intermediate values it is 
more significant. Hence, the tournament will only be extended if the ratio adopts an 
intermediate value. 
 
Appendix 
In this appendix, proposition 2 is proved. 
Transforming condition (7) and using σ∆= a:y  yields: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ).qpr1qy2mry21mm1m −−⋅>⋅Φ−⋅⋅+Φ⇔π>π +  
The derivative of the function ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ).qpr1qy2mry21m:yH −−⋅−⋅Φ−⋅⋅+Φ=  
with respect to y is ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2my2mr21my21myyH ⋅⋅Φ′−⋅+⋅⋅+Φ′=∂∂ , or, 
using ( ) ( ) 2y5.0e21y ⋅−⋅π⋅=Φ′ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅⋅π⋅−⋅+⋅⋅π⋅=∂∂ ⋅−⋅
+−
2me21r21me21yyH
22 y
4
my
4
1m
. This derivative is 
positive if the following condition holds: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2rm1mlnyy25.0rm1mlnmr1me 5.02y25.0 2 ⋅⋅+<⇔⋅>⋅+⇔>⋅+⋅⋅− . 
We see that ( )(( 2rm1mlny 5.0* ⋅⋅+= ))  is the maximum of H. Note that  for ( ) 0yH < 0y =  
and . As  is a continuous function, it must have exactly two nulls  and , if ∞→y ( )yH yˆ y~
( ) 0yH * > . Otherwise, that is, if ( ) 0yH * < , it is always negative. 
 14
Inserting  into H yields: *y
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) .qp r1qrm1mln2m2rrm1mln2 1m2yH 5.05.0* −−⋅−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅⋅Φ−⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅+⋅Φ=
This maximum is strictly negative for ( )( ) 5.0m1mr −+= , but strictly positive for r=1. The 
derivative of ( )*yH  with respect to r is given by: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ).qpqr1rm1mln2mrm1mln2m2
rm1mln21mrm1mln21m2
rm1mln21m2
r
yH
5.05.0
5.05.0
5.0*
−+⋅⋅+⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅⋅Φ′−
⋅+⋅+⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅+⋅Φ′+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅+⋅Φ=∂
∂
−
−
 
This derivative is positive if the difference between the second and the third term is non-
negative, i.e., if the subsequent condition holds: 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) 0r1mrm1mln2m21mrm1mln21m2
0r1rm1mln2mrm1mln2m2
rm1mln21mrm1mln21m2
5.05.0
5.05.0
5.05.0
≥⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅⋅Φ′−+⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅+⋅Φ′⇔
≥⋅⋅+⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅⋅Φ′−
⋅+⋅+⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅+⋅Φ′
−
−
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) .rm1mrm1m
mr1me
0me21r1me21
25.0
2
5.0
2
5.0
rm1mln5.025.0
rm1mln
2
m25.0rm1mln
2
1m25.0
⋅+≥⋅+⇔
≥⋅+⋅⇔
≥⋅⋅π⋅−⋅+⋅⋅π⋅⇔
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅⋅⋅−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅⋅⋅−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅+⋅⋅−
 
Hence, we have shown that ( ) ryH * ∂∂  is positive. Since ( )*yH  is positive for r=1, there must 
be some cut-off value r~ , at which ( )*yH  becomes positive. This proves parts (i) and (ii) of 
proposition 2. Consider now part (iii). Using the method of implicit differentiation together 
with condition 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) 0qp r
~1qr~m1mln
2
m2r~r~m1mln
2
1m2
5.05.0 =−
−⋅−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅⋅Φ−⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅+⋅Φ , 
one can immediately show that 0pr~ <∂∂  and 0qr~ >∂∂ , since ( ) 0pyH >∂∂  and 
( ) 0qyH <∂∂ . As the derivative ( ) yyH ∂∂  is independent of p and q, an increase in p (q) only 
shifts the function  upwards (downwards) and so yields a decrease (increase) in  and an 
increase (decrease) in . Finally, consider the derivative of 
( )yH yˆ
y~ ( )( ) ( )y2mry21m ⋅Φ−⋅⋅+Φ  
with respect to m. One can show that this derivative is negative, if and only if 
 15
( ) 2y5.0erm1m ⋅−⋅>+ , which is always fulfilled. Hence, if m increases, the function ( )yH  
will decrease. As a consequence, r~  must be increasing in m. Further, we know that ( ) 0yˆH = . 
Therefore ( )( ) ( )( )yˆyˆHmyˆHmyˆ ∂∂∂∂−=∂∂ , which is positive as . Analogously, one 
can prove that 
*yyˆ <
0my~ <∂∂ . This proves part (iii) of proposition 2. 
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